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Abstract
In common sense, electronic transactions through
secure transaction protocols are secure. However, not all
so-called secure transaction protocols are secure. To
verify [he protocols this paper proposes the A'DL (non-
monotonic dvnamic logic). .4 novel idea oj jail-negate,
namelv non-monotonic, is proposed in :VDL. Thus some
securi ZV properties are believed [0 he [rue if 11'e,based on
current conditions, cannot prove they are false. On the
other hand. the dynamic property in NDL converts the
transaction into an action sequences. To evaluate the
logic. 111'0 instances are illustrated. Front the evaluation,
il is convinced that the NDL is effective and promising.
Keywords: Security: Secure protocol; Electronic
conunerce: Xon-monotonic; Verification.
1. Introduction
Electronic commerce on the Internet experiences
explosive growth. The facts listed below should be good
evidence:
Visa. a major credit card issuer. says that the
number of online business . transaction
completed annually is 15.3 billion in 1998 and
estimates it will reach 100 billion in 2002 [3].
Security is a necessary concern in e-commerce. Nearlv
everyday. a news organization reports a potential securitv
violation on the Internet. Securitv in electronic commerce
depends heavily on the use of secure protocols. They may
safeguard the conununications between the principals
such as the key-exchange and authentication. Therefore
the secure protocols have become the key component of
electronic conunerce systems.
During the past decade, there have been remarkable
efforts devoted to develop the method, theories, logics
and formal methods. and supporting tools. These efforts
can aid the designer of protocols in detecting and
correcting weakness and redundancies in the protocol
design stage. For instance. several protocols 1111:' I luve
been revealed to have some flaws. Current researches
have been divided into two classes: Attack-construcuon
approach endeavours to construct possible attacks usiru;
algebraic properties of the algorithms in the protocols.
and inference-construction approach endeavour 10
construct inferences using specialised logics based 011 a
notion of knowledge and "belief'
Attack-construction approach is the COllstnIC[IOIlof
probable attack sets based on the algebraic properties of a
protocol algoritlun. involving the work of Dolev and Yao
[9]. the NRL Analyzer [10]. and the Interrogator Maciel
[11]. These work figure out how to ensure authcnticatior
and security properties: they do not depend on the validif
of a proposed logic.
Inference-construction approach utilizes modal logic
similar to those that have been developed for the analys
of the evolution of knowledge and belief in distribu«
systems. This includes the BAN logic in 1.+I. (he AT log
in [12] and the GNY logic in [131[1'+]. The BAN iOf
abstracts all but the information intended to be convev
from the sender to the recipient. Thus. it is simple a
has been successfully applied to discover n;l\\s ir
variety of authentication protocols (e.g .. 11112 j) There
some extensions of the above three logics. The BG
logic (developed by Brackin) [8] is all extension of
GNY logic, and is used by software that autolll<ltic
proves authentication properties of cryplogra
protocols. The AUTLOG logic (an advanced logil
authentication) [16] is based on the BAN logic This I
proposes a predicate; recognize' and extends the me,"
of the operator 'see'. Meanwhile. an eavesdropper is
simulated in the logic.
Most of the existing methods focus on the n~rifi(
of the key management protocols and authentic
protocols. Two of the main limitations in e~
methods are as follows.
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1. Because the attack-construction approach suffers
from a huge state space. it has low efficiency in
detecting attacks on large secure transaction
protocols.
2 The inference-construction approach is still
complicated when used for the verification of
secure protocols. For example. BAN logic requires
a large number of assumptions that a secret remains
secret during the execution of protocols [15]: and
the GNY logic contains many rules that have to be
considered at each stage.
E-commerce protocols. however. are inherently
complex and a number of published protocols of this
naturecontain subtle errors. The methods for verification
ofe-commcrce protocols are not quite as mature as those
usedfor authentication protocols. Kailar has proposed a
special-purpose logic. which is used for the analysis of
secure electronic commerce protocols that require
accountability [7]. This logic is more suited to the
analysis of accountability than are the belief logics.
Meadows and Syverson [17] have designed a language
fordescribing SET specifications. but have not actually
verified the protocol Also. Kessler and Neumann [241
havedesigned a belief logic to analyze a single message
ofthepayment phase of SET.
So. it is very difficult to develop a method that can be
suitablefor all related protocols. Thereby. we advocate a
logicalframework. NDL. for secure transaction protocols.
The NDL is referred as an inference-construction
approach.Compared to traditional techniques. the NDL
hassome features. such as/ail-negate. dynamic. and non-
monotonic.These properties enable us to resolve two key
problems:
• confidentiality: the intruder may detect and
intercept some commercial information as
message is travelled across the network.
• integrity: attacker may alter the message content
during the transmission between the originator and
the recipient.
To evaluate the logic. two instances are illustrated.
Fromour evaluation. it is convinced that the NDL is
effectiveand promising.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section
~presentsa computational model In Section 3. a formal
escnptlonof basic notations and statements of NDL are
~rovided.Section 4 gives the axioms. inference rules and
t~ereasoning format. Section 5 gives two instances for
eapplicatIonof NDL. We conclude in the last Section.
2.AComputational Model
coThe public environment is an open network that is
li:osed of principals connected by communication
ace. All k1l1ds of messages on these links. such as
aunt number and key. constitute the communication
between principals. The principal can operate the
message. such as modification. on a link. An open
network in fact consists of a set of principals. messages
and processes. Following the rules in protocols the
principals can interact with each other for accomplishing
a common task (e.g .• to encrypt a message). Interactions
are based on messages that are conveyed via a
communication facility.
The secure transaction protocol is a method used to
secure transactions over an open network and carried out
by the principals. The protocol is organised into several
stages by message transmissions. such as a request for
certificating authority. in which cryptography is used to
provide confidentiality of information to ensure data
integrity and to authenticate the participants. A special
execution of protocol is called a "session'. For
convenience, this paper only consider sessions that appear
to end successfully. The overhead issues are excluded.
At each stage of a protocol session. every principal
has a finite set of received data items. which it had before
the session began. or which were extracted from the
messages sent to it before, or during the current stage.
Also, if principal A authenticates the messages /JI sent
from principal B, then A believes /1/. This indicates that
principal A has enough confidence in message /JI.
After receiving a message. the principal Sl<lJ15
verification of the message by using the inference rule
and related axioms. The message and verification form
the initial set of received data items and their confidences
for processing next time. During the verification. if the
principal cannot conclude that 'principal [3 1\.110\\5
message /JI '. then the principal believes '[3 does not I\.nO\\
/1/ '.
To explore a flaw-free protocol. NDL is proposed in
this paper. The NDL is a natural and practical analysis
strategy for the verification of secure protocols. It has
well-integrated techniques taken from single-rank logic.
dynamic logic and non-monotonic logic. for efficiently
identifying flaws. For simplicity, we assume that all
principals involved in a transaction do not divulge their
secret. In addition. we assume that the cryptographic
algoritIuns and communication protocols are sound
during the verification.
3. Basic Notations and Statements
Generally. uppercase X, r. .t 13. C. and (~-1
(Certificate Authorities) ranger over particular principals.
/JIb 11/;;, ••••.• , and /JIn denote specific messages. (In this
paper. keys and the encrypted messages are regarded as
messages either.) T denotes a specific timestamp
"Generate" and "Send" denote specific actions.
(Encryption and digital signature are some mapping
operation on message, but not action.) "Knowledge state"
denotes a specific knowledge relation between principal
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and message. "Authentication" denotes a specific belief
relation.
Fresh is applied to a process that asserts this term was
created for a current session and not recorded from an
earlier session. A principal believes a term is fresh if it
can identify the term as created for the current session
whenever tlus term comes into its possession. To consider
the possibility that communication keys may be
compromised and the timestamp may prevent replays, we
now introduce timestamp T for freshness of message. If
the clock synchronization of both parties is difficult, a
trusted third party can intervene as a notary and use its
own clock as a reference [22]. Actually, the timestamp
has the additional benefit of replacing the two-step
handshake in the Needham and Schroeder protocol for a
public key system, but the exposure of a user's private
keys cannot be eliminated by the timestamp. Unless
compromises are reported to the AS (authentication
server) and public keys are obtained from the AS
immediately prior to use, timestamps are useful for
validating the time integrity of keys [6].
Authentication denotes specific belief relations. The
purpose of authentication of participants is to reduce, if
not eliminate. the risk that intruders might masquerade
under legitimate appearances to pursue unauthorized
operations.
Function word:
E(/II.k ): TIllS represents the operation that message m is
encrypted under the symmetric key k.
\'01/, k): This represents the operation that message 111is
encrypted under the public key k, namely Kpb/X). KpvtX),
SIJhr-l/. and Spv(.Y) listed below.
H (Ill): This represents the message digest of message !II
encoded by the one-way hashing algorithm. The one-way
Hash function has the property that given tile output it is
difficult to determine the input.
Kph(X): The public key-exchange key of X
Kpv/X): The private key-exchange key of X
Spbtv): The public signature key of X
SP\'(X): The private signature key of X
11I1,11I:;,.... ·./IIn>: The combination of messages mi. Ill:;
.. , and /lin.
Predicate:
f:1I01l'(x' Ill): X knows message Ill. It is possible that Y
generates the message /II by itself or receives m from 1".
.Ili/Mr, 1"./II): X authenticates message 111sent by Y and m
has not been modified.
Action :
Generate/X, 1I1):.r generates the message !II.
Sellcl(.\'. y, 1/1): X sends the message /II to Y.
lf a and fJ are basic sequences of action. then a 0 fJ.
which is the conjunction of a and fJ. can be treated as an
action sequences either.
Assertion:
P and Q present a set of formulae; and a denat
. TI" if es anaction sequences. us assertion means I P is hUe tb
can be executed, and Q will be true if a car, be perfa: Q
successfully. ell
Abbreviation: We define four expressions, abbreViat
to simplify the conjunctions of several function wo :
since these conjunctions repeatedly appear in Our l~gi~
system.
Sign(X, m)=<m, S«JDx, H(m», Spv("\j»: This lUeans
that plaintext IJI and A's identifier JDx are attached toXs
digital signature.
Sign (X. mJr = <in, S«JDx. T, H(III». Spv(X))>: Inserting
the timestamp T into Sign/X, m). 0
So/X, m) = S«JDx. Htmi>, SpviXj), TIllS means that
identifier JDx was attached to .\~s digital signature before
X encrypted tile message digest of 1/1 in the private
signature key Spv(X).
So(.'I.: mJr = S«JDx, T. H(/II», Spv(\)): Inserting the
timestamp T into So(X, m).
CertKP0 = Sign(CA, <X, Kpb.X)»): TIllS means that the
key -exchange certificate of X.
CertS(.Y) = Sign( CA. <.\~Spb/X)>]; TIllS means that the
signature certificate of X.
4. Inference Framework
In this section. we present the axioms. inference rules.




1-1 Know(.."( Ill) A Kno\l'r:.r. k) -> f:170l1'(X, F(IIl. k))
This means that, if .Y knows message m and
symmetric key k, then X knows E(III, k) by using k to
encrypt message Ill.
J-2 Know();.~ Ill) A Know(X Kpb(Y)) -> Know(X.
S«T, m », Kpb(Y}))
TIllS means that,.if X knows message III and public
key-exchange key KpbfYJ of Y, then X knows S«T. m>,







That is, X knows public key-exchange key f:pb(CAJ
of C4. (Certificate Authorities): X knows public signature
key Spb(C4.) of CA: X knows exchange and private
signature key itself.
328
2002 International Conference on Intelligent Information Technology Proceedings
(3) Decryption
3-1 KnoH'(.Y. k) /\ KnowtX, £(111,k)) - KnowtX. 111)
That is. if X knows symmetric key k and £(111,k), then
X knows the plain text of message 111 by using k to decrypt
£(111,k).
3-2 Know (.Y, KpvtYl) /\ KnowtX, S(I1I, Kpb(Y))) -
Know(.Y. 111)
That is. if X knows private key-exchange key Kpv/Y)
of rand S(I1I, Kpbt'Yl). then X knows the plain text of
message 1/1 by using the Kpv/Y) to decrypt S(I11,Kpb(Y)).
(4) Signature
./-1 KnowX, 1/1) - KnowiX. H(I1I))
That is. if X knows 111, then X knows H (111).
./-2 J.:noll'(.\~ 1/1) /\ Know (X, Spv(Y)) - Know/X,
Sr H(I/I), Spv(r)))
That is. if X knows message 111 and private signature
key SpvO"J of l, then X knows S'(H(I/I), SpvrY)) by using
Spl'(J) to encrypt H (111).
(5)Authcntication
5-1 J.:nOlI"(X, /7/) /\ Know(.\~ S«JDr, T. H(/7/», SPI'(l)))
iCJC'Ck-Ti':
/\ Know (.r. SpbrrJJ ~ Auth(X Y,I1I)
This means that. if X knows message /7/. S«JDr, T,
H(I11», Spv/Yi). and Spb/Y), then Y can authenticate Y
sent 111. and /7/ has not been modified by using Spb (Y) to
decrypt S'(:JDr, T, H (m) >, Spv(Y)) and comparing the
result with a newly generated message digest of 1/1.
Simultaneously. X verifies that a message is not replays
by checking that :Clock -Ti < t. tl +.0. to. where Clock is
the local time.'" tl is an interval representing the normal
discrepancy between the server's clock and the local
clock. and -'" I: is an interval representing the expected
networkdelay time.
5-:! Kn01I"(.Y./7/) /\AlIth(.\~ Y, H(I/I)) - Auth(.\.', Y. 111)
That is. if X knows message /7/. and authenticates r
sent H(I11) that has not been modified. then X can
authenticate Y sent /1/, and IJIhas not been modified.
5-3 Knoll'r.\: Spb(l")) /\ KnowtX, S«T, T, Spbm) >,
Spl'(CA))) /\ Knowtv, Sph(C4)) IClock-Ti'
.. J. II"'" '!--.---+ AlIth(.r, Y, Sph(Y))
S' :hal is. if X ~nows SphO? and S«1,', T, SP?O"))>,
pI r~A}). then .\ can authenticate Sph(]) by using the
:~Ubhcsignature key of CA .to decrypt the encrypted
lessage and checking the tnnestamp included in the
llIessage.
(6) Separation
6-1 Knoll'(.\.: <1/11, "', m.> ) <-> KnowiX, /7/L) /\ ... /\
Know(.\: IJIn)
That is. if'.Vknows the conjunction of messages 111i. 1!1]
'''·.",ond 1/1". then Y knows every element of this
c°I!lunction.or vice versa. .
6-2 AUfh(.\', l, <111]0 ••• , 111,,» - Auth/X, l, 1111} /\ •••
/\ Auth(X, y. IJIn)
That is. if X authenticates that r ever sent a compound
of messages 1111,/7/] , , and ni; that has not been
modified. then X authenticates that J' ever sent every
element of it and none of it have not been modified. .
Based on the notations. statements and axioms
described above. two theorems listed below can be
naturally proved.
Theoreml: Know (X, /7/) /\ Know(X, s'O(r, I/IJr) /\ Know o:
!C1ock -TI -: .
Spb(Y)) ~ Auth(.\: r, III)
[Proof]:
(1) Know(.Y,m) [premise]
(2) KnowiX, So(Y, mJr) [premise]
(3)Know(\.~ Spb(Y)) [premise J
(4)Knoll'(.\~ S'«JDr, T. no»». Spl'(Y))) [definition]
(5~4ufh(.\', Y, III) (1)(3)(4 )[5-11
(6)Knoll'(.\~ m)1\K.J101I'(r. So(Y, IIIJr)/\J.:nOlI'(.Y. Sph(l))
-Auth(r, 1', III) (1)(2)(3)(5)[ ----+ +J
The proof can easily be constructed by using the
authentication axiom 5- 1 and the definition of Sur)', II/I;.
which is an equivalent expression of S'( T H(lIIj ,
Spvm).
Theorem 2: Knowts: Signt )', /ll)r) /\ Knowtv. Spbt t))
iOuck -ri-
~~ .-Julh(#r. r, ni),
[proof]:
(l)Knoll'(X, Sign (1', mh) [premise]
(2)Kno\l'(X, Spb(Y)) [premise J
(3)KI101V(.l, <m. S«JDr, T, H(m», S/JI'O)) (I)[definiton]
(4 )Knoll' (X, 111) (3 )[6-1]
(5)Know(\~ S«JDr, T, H (111», Spv(Y))) (3 )[6-1 J
(6)Kno\l'(X, So(r, ml) (5)[defiIution]
(7)Auth(.\~ r,l1I) (2)(4)(6)[Thcorcm 1]
(8) Know (\', Signt)'. 11IM /\ Knowiv. SphrJ')) -
Authis, J, Ill). (1)(2)(7)[ ----+ +1
Sign/Y, IIIJr is an equivalent expression of /11I,
S«lDr, T, Htnn>, SPI'(Y)). The above two simple
theorems are common processes in secure protocol and
provide a compendious and perspicuous \\a~ describing
the operation of digital signature in secure protocol.
4.2 Inference Rules
(R-l) Revelation
KnowtX, 111) ~ Sent/(X, r,m)KI10W(Z, 111)
states that the secret cannot be protected when plain text
is transferred in a practical distributed system and an open
network. The rule. in fact provides a convenient wav to
simulate the eavesdropper during the communication ..
(R-2) Generation
~ Generale(X. IIl)KI10W(X, 111)
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says that if message 11/ is generated by X then Y itself
must know Ill.
(R-3) Accumulation
says that if the conclusion Q has been proved to be tme,
then it remains tme after action a. Actually, this rule
cannot accommodate to any secure protocols for two
reasons: (I) if the keys are altered during the execution of
protocol, then the knowledge about the keys is outdated;
(2) if the protocols do not provide a memory function, the
knowledge about message III can be forgotten. Therefore,
the logic system mentioned in this paper can only be
applied to protocols satisfying the following two
conditions: (I) the keys cannot be replaced during tile
execution of the protocol; (2) every principal must store
the knowledge of the message. SET and X.509 Certificate
Policv satisfv these two conditions in terms of our current
verification .. To the exceptional circumstances. we will




says that if the conclusion Q of the former action a is tile
premise of the later action 13. then a and 13 can be
synthesized by acting the original conclusion R of 13 as the
ultimate conclusion. In fact. tile synthesis of actions can
be regarded as a kind of algebraic operation with the
union property.
(R-5) Non-monotonic
~ a Auth(X, Y, m)
p 1- a ~Auth(X, Y,m)
says that if we cannot conclude that a principal .r
successfully authenticates /1/ after a sequence of action a,
then we non-monotonously assume that X does not
believe the validity of /1/. Here. Non-monotonic means
based on the only knowledge. premise P and action a, if
we cannot conclude X know Ill. then it is reasonable to
suppose X does not know Ill: but it is quite possible to
conclude .r know III as P or a is extended, so the non-
monotonic assumption will be correspondingly modified
in terms of the new instance. This. in fact. reflects a
typical phenomenon in the verification of transaction
protocols: it is Vel} difficult to affirmatively and
unconditionally judge what principal X does not know
since the message can be intercepted. However. we can
accept that X should not know 111 if the paths are toulimited for j\:" to understand Ill.
4.3 Inference Format
TIIis inference format stems from the accumUlation
property described above where G. a.. V'.' an an~t.
express an action sequences and formula set respectivel'~·.O
8 (empty sequence of action) .
f01 ,fo: f rJ110
fll,fi: Jiml
The above expression can be compressed by using an
assertion to describe the procedure of deduction. The
union of formula is derived from the definition of the
assertion. for instance, {.!oi. fo::· ... [;JIl oj is a formula, so
each 10, is a subset of this formula Furthermore. the
synthesis of assertion is. in fact. derived from inference
rule R-3 and R-4. This format can be described by another
expression as shown below:
{fOl,fO:: frJ1101 ~ a, {fll,Ji: JimJ1
{f0l,f02 frJ1101 ~ a..a- {f:l,J:::: j;11l2}
{f0l,f02 f rJ1101~ a, .a-, . . a" {f,'l1 1,,:
...... f,,11l,J
This inference format is based on the accumulation
and dynamic properties of transaction protocols. It is well
known that a message can be modified or intercepted
during transmission, so an eavesdropper can impersonate
the sender or receiver and continue the transaction. In this
paper. we assume these problems. which have been
detected until now, are protected by existing technologies
such as [6][20][21]. Therefore we do not need to be too
concerned about network communication, eavesdropping.
hashing. and encryption algorithms. Thus. this paper
concentrates on how the NDL may be used on the
verification of secure transaction protocols. rather than
how to construct a secure protocol.
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5. Verification instances of secure protocols
inNDL
To evaluate the framework NDL two instances are
used to demonstrate the use of the NDL when verifying a
secure protocol.
Example 1: Distribution of Public keys in Needham
lind Schroeder's protocol.
Timestamp can be added to Needham and Schroeder's
protocols for public key systems. This has been proposed
bv Denning [6]. In this instance, we show that our logic
d~tectsa known flaw in the protocol.
The protocol opens with A consulting tile
authentication server AS in tile clear to find B:« public
key. The exchange can be described in a series of
"actionssequence".
A->AS: a, <SendtA, AS, <A, B» (1.1)
AS->A' a- =Senc!(.1S, A, S«B, Spb (B», Spv(AS))) (1.2)
A->B:a3=Send(.-1. B, S(lDA, A>, Spb(B))) (1.3)
B->AS:a~ = SendrB, AS, <B, A» (1.4)
AS->B:aj=Senc!(.·1.<";,B, S«Spb(A), A>, S[)1'(.4.S))) (1.5)
B->A:ao=Send(B, A, S«lDA,lDB>, Spb(.4.))) (1.6)
A->B:a,=Send(.4. B, S(lDB, Spb(B))) (1.7)
whereSpl'rAS) denotes AS's private signature key and
Spb(B)is B's: public signature key. A is presumed to know
AS's public signature key (derived from 2-2) since AS is
an authority.
We start the verification from the goal A lith (.4. , AS,
Spb(B))and let CK=<B, Spbib) Formula P denotes the
setofpremise: o: is the combination of a series of actions:
and Formula Q denotes the object we want to verify.
P= {KnoH'(A, Spht ASll},
IJ. = Generate/A ,<•.'1, B> j 0 a,! 0 Generate/AS, S(CK,
Spv(C4))) 0 a,: 0 GenerateiA, S«lD.j, A>, Spb (Bll) 0 a,3
Q = (.411th(A,AS, SpbrB))}.
Proof:
11) Know(A. Spb(.4S)j [2-2]
(2) Generate(A ,<A, B» [action]
(3) Know(.4 , <A, B» (2)[R-2]
(+)Send(.4,AS, <.4, B» (3) [I.I]
(5) Know(AS, <A: B» (4)[R-l]
\6)Know(AS, B) (5)[6-1]
(7) Generate(AS, SrCK, Spv(C4))) (6)[2-4]
(81Know(.4S, S(CK, SpvrC4))) (7) [R-2]
(9) Send(.4s, A, SrC'K, Spv(.4Sj)) (8) [1.2]
nO)Know(.4,Sr<B. SpMBJ>, Spl'(ASj)) (9)[R-l]
~l) ~.4l1th(A. AS, Spb{BJ) (1)(3) (lO)[5-3][R-5]
\.~ final c?nclusion is that A fails to authenticate the
d dlt) of Spb(BJ sent by AS since the existing conditionsOn t . .
CQn 0 sallsfy the requirement of axiom (5-3). We may
\'ali~~Udenon.-monotonically that A does not believe th'e
1"0 t} of .SpbrB) encrypted by AS due to the non-'",not . '.oiuc rule (R-5). Thus, the message is rejected and
an appropriate response message is returned to the AS
issued the Spli(B). AS may need to revoke B's public
signature key and identify it.
The reason for this is that tile intruder was able to
intercept the message from (4) and (9) and replay tile
encrypted component from message (10). The weakness
that allowed tile attack lies in the fact that this protocol
did not add a timestamp to step (9). This would haw
made the recipient suspect that the message was a replay.
Example 2: One section of Cardholder Registration in
SET protocol.
Based on the SET protocol developed by Visa and
MasterCard in May of 1997, on the advice of GTE. IBM.
Microsoft, Netscape. RSA [17][ 18][ 19], we describe a
simple example of registration, which is started when the
cardholder C request an copy of CA's key-exchange
certificate. There are two principals in this instance:
cardholder C and certificate authority C4.
C -+ CA: aj= Send/C. CA, Initkeq) (2.1)
CA-+Ca2=Send(CA, C, <CertS(C4) , CertK(CA), S('
InitRes, Htlnitkest>, S'pv(C4))» (2.2)
C-+CA: a3=Send(C. C4, <E(RegFor11lReq, k),
S«AcctNum, k>.Kpb(CA))» (2.3)
Here, InitReq denotes initial request sent by C to C4.
When CA receives the request, it generates response
InitRes and digitally signs it. It then sends the response
along with the C4 certificate to C. After verifying the (',-1
certificate, C generates registration form Regl onnlceq
and encrypts the message with a randomly generated
symmetric key k. This key. along with the Cs account
number Acctbium is then encrypted with SpdC-l; C
transmits these messages to C4.
We begin the verification from the goal AuthrC, (~-1.
InitRes). The definitions of P, a, and Q have the same
meaning as above.
P = (Know(C, Spb(C4))},
a,= Generate/C. InitReq) 0 a,l 0 GeneratetclA, <CerStt..A).
CertK(C4) , Initkes, S(H(lnitRes), Spv(CA))» 0 a,: 0
Generate/C. <E( Regliormlieq, k), S«AcctNu11I, k>,
Kpb(CA))» 0 a,3
Q = (AlIth(C, CA, InitRes)}.
Proof:
(I) Know(C, Spb(CA)) [2-2]
(2) Generatettl.Initlieq) [action]
(3) Know/C. InitReq) (2)[R-2]
(4) Send(C, CA, Initlieq) (3) [2.1]
(5) Knoll'rCA.Ini/Req) (4)[R-l]
(6) Generate/Ca. <CertS(CA), CertK(ClJ, InitRel,
S(H(InitResJ, Spv(Cl))>J (5)[2-4 J [action]
(7)Know(C4. <CertS(C4) , CerrK(C4), InitRes, St Ht
InitRes), S'pv(C4)) (6)[R-2J
(8)Send(CA,C, <CertS(CA) , CertK(CAJ, InitRes,S(H(
InitRes), Spv(C4))» (7)[2.2]
(9)Knoll'(c' <CertS(C4), CertK(C4), InitRes, S(H(
In itRes) , S'pv(C4))» (8)[R-l]
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(1-+) <Autht;'. Cl, !nitResj
(l )(9)(13)[ 6-1 ][Theorem 1][R-5]
In the specifications of SET protocoL the Cardholder
identifies the Chall-EE bv deciding whether it is equal to
the one sent in the CardCInitReq. Actually, if the
challenge-response mechanisms work well the Chall-EE
needs not be hidden from an intruder, but if not we have
to wonder the efficiency of Chall-Ef, such as the
interception of the Chall-EE by intruder. Also. we have to
concem the compromise of Cardholder. Thereby. we
think the principal should verify that their messages are
not replays by checking that IClock -Ti < ~ tl+:'1 l: The
SET protocol doesn't give detailed description on that so
a special timestamp instead of Chall-Ef is introduced
here for the sake of security.
During the verification. C fails to authenticate the
validitv of InitRes sent bv C4. thus the authentication
should be halted immediately for the non-monotonic rule
(R-5) The flaw detected for InitRes encrypted by
.\jJl'IC'.·1; does not include the timestamp and identifier, so
the intruder can replay this message in a later transaction.
This problem is common in the literature [23] The
identifier is a random number and is used only once, but
the certificate is a long-term word. so the certificate
cannot substitute for the identifier.
(I) C --> 1(C4) InitReq
(2) DC) --> CA: InitReq'
(3 )Cl-->l(O CertSrC'.4), Certl\.'(C4j, Initlces',
S(H(InitRes '). Spl'(C4)) >
(2') lrC) --> C4InitReq"
(3')CI-->ZrO CertSrC4), CerrKrC1), Initkes ". Sr
Htlnitlces ' 'j, Spl'(C4jj>
(-+ )lrC1)-->C: <CertS(CA) , CertK(C4),JnirRes',
Hilnitlces 'j, Spl'(CA)j>
Here the intruder Z intercepts the initial request from C to
C-l and replaces it with a new initial request initlieq '. It
then sends the result to CI as message (2). CI replies
with message (3) Z impersonates C to produces a new
message (2 ') and sends it to C4, C4 answers C with a
corresponding message (3 '). and then Z intercepts it. At
last. Z impersonates C'I to send an outdated message (4)
that is intercepted by 1 from message (3) C cannot
authenticate the message since it docs not include a
timestamp and identifier. This attack is used continuously
until C needs to bring about authentication between C and
CI again. The best solution is to include a timestamp and
identifier in the message sent by CA. even though you
think certificate is secure. In fact. the protocol designer
must be very careful to detect every possible subtle
drawback when the protocol is in the design stage.





environment (for instance stock-trading). It may Ca\l.iea
great loss if intruder detects the flaws.
These two instances convince that NDL is usefulfOr
verifying the secure protocols.
From the above .observations.. . the proposen
framework NDL IS effective and pronusmg. ExampleI
derived from Needham and Schroeder's Protocols f~
public key systems. is regarded as secure. AlthOUgh
author uses double handshake to assure the infOffilation
remains secret during the communication. we have
proved it has a flaw, Example 2 is drawn from SET
protocol that is commonly thought to be a standard for
future electronic commerce. In our approach. we detecla
subtle flail' there. The consequences are not seriou, sinCe
it is not easy for all. intruder to turn the content of U\e
certificate. However. this certainly represents an attack
since it leads to an intruder holding incorrect beliefC4
believes that it is C who thought it was talking to C4.
6. Conclusions
S(
The explosion of publicity of electronic commerce lIaS
enormously impacted on the financial services induslIy.
This also causes some security risks associated with
sending unprotected financial information across public
networks such as confidentiality and integrity Therefore,
some secure protocols have been developed. However.
many secure protocols still suffer from some subtle defect
in spite of a lot of researches on this subject So a variety
of formal methods have been developed for analysing
secure protocols. for instance. BAN logic. GNY logic.
BGNY logic. and AUTLOG logic. But the result is notas
good as people expects.
This paper proposes a new logic NDL for the
verification of secure protocols. It is based on the
dvnamic and non-monotonic properties. Meanwhile. NDL
presents more suitable than the existing logics used in the
analvsis of secure transaction protocols
in particular. the verification can automatically halts
in answer to anv unsuccessful authentication under our
framework. The;efore, we can reduce the authentication
of security problems. In addition. by introducing the
notation of identifier and timestamp. which help the
designer of protocol to detect attacks, we can protect
against replays,
The instances presented in Section 5 demonstrate that
NDL is useful for finding some known defects. In
addition. it detects some subtle flaws in the SET protocol.
Thus. NDL is effective and hopeful.
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